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Numerous articles in top IS journals note as a 
limitation and lack of generalizability that their 
findings are specific to a certain type of technology, 
culture, and so on. We argue that this generalizability 
concern is about limited scope (e.g., explanatory 
breadth). The IS literature notes this preference for 
generalizability as a characteristic of good science and 
it is sometimes confused with statistical 
generalizability We argue that such generalizability 
can be in conflict with explanation or prediction 
accuracy. An increase in scope (e.g., increasing 
explanatory breadth) can decrease explanation or 
prediction accuracy. Thus, in sciences such as cancer 
research, where explanation and prediction accuracy 
are highly valued, the cancer accounts (generally 
speaking) have become increasingly narrower (and 
less generalizable). IS thinking has not yet benefitted 
from these considerations. Whether generalizability is 
valued should be linked with the research aims. If the 
aim is practical applicability through explanation or 
prediction accuracy, then “limited” generalizability 
could be a strength rather than a weakness.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The term generalizability is widely used in IS 
research articles, often in the limitations section, 
describing the lack of generalizability as a study 
limitation [1]. Typically, IS studies note that some of 
their findings are specific to a certain type of 
technology, country or organizational culture, and so 
on. For example, a study in India or Sweden may have 
India- or Sweden-specific findings, which are not 
applicable (generalizable) to outside of India or 
Sweden. Such India- or Sweden-specific findings are 
then noted as a limitation. As a concrete example, [2 p. 
11] reported that “it is important to acknowledge 
several limitations. First, all data were collected from 
one organization, with one type of IT professional—
the RW; hence, the results should not be generalized to 
other types of IT workers or organizations.” To give 
another example, “Our findings should be interpreted 
in light of the limitations of this work. First, data were 
collected from two organizations that were of similar 
size and with similar operations in the same industry.  
Although this helped us control for possible industry 
differences, it limits the generalizability of our 
findings…Second, data were collected in the context of 
a specific ES implementation: a SAP ERP system. It is 
possible that our results would be different in other 
ERP systems..” [3 p. 1135].  
Baskerville and Lee [1 p. 49] claimed that “It is 
incorrect and even harmful that many information 
systems researchers typically criticize their own 
intensive (qualitative, interpretive, critical, and case) 
research as lacking generalizability.” Influential 
sources suggest that such lack of generalizability 
claims results because qualitative studies have to meet 
the standard of a statistical, sample-based conception 
of generalizability [4].1 However, in the two examples 
above, the generalizability concern is not statistical 
generalizability; e.g., it does not relate to sample size 
adequateness. Findings regarding the “type of IT 
workers” are not generalizable to other IT workers [2]. 
In addition, “different ERPs” and “industry type” may 
not be transferable to other ERPs and industry types 
[3]. Nevertheless, in our experience, such a lack of 
generalizability can qualify as a reason to reject papers 
in top IS journals. 
What do these examples demonstrate, if not issues 
of statistical generalizability? The point is not that 
theory contextualizations are not preferred. We suggest 
the interpretation that they stem from study, model, or 
theory scope preferences. For example, “an often 
admired quality of theories in natural sciences is their 
applicability to a range of settings” [5 p. 35]. 
Generalizability is also seen as the fundamental aim of 
                                                
1“Published Research that Applies the Statistical, Sampling-Based 
Conception of Generalizability to Nonstatistical, Nonsampling 
Research” [4 p. 223]. Also: “researchers should not give up claims to 
generality on the basis of…small n,” and they should have a “right to 
generalize and claim generality” [1 p. 61, 63]. 







sciences in IS [6]. This preference is also attributed to 
basic research and practical applicability [4 p. 221]: 
“the generalizability of an IS theory to different 
settings is important not only for purposes of basic 
research, but also for purposes of managing and 
solving problems that corporations and other 
organizations experience in society.” Similarly, Weber 
[7 p. 15] noted that “Some theories cover a very 
narrow, constrained set of phenomena. Because of the 
limited range of phenomena it covers, however, it runs 
the risk it will be deemed uninteresting and 
unimportant.” Moreover, Davison and Martinsons [8 p. 
242] noted that “research that is relevant for and 
applicable to a wider range of phenomena is 
traditionally considered to be more useful.” Finally, 
“Presumably, the wider the range of the theory’s 
application, the more generalizability it offers and the 
stronger the theory” [9 p. 9]. We are not aware of any 
IS study that suggests that a narrower range makes a 
theory stronger or more useful.  
These IS views make sense (with certain 
reservations) if the IS phenomenon is governed by 
laws. In the past, philosophers who assumed true laws, 
such as Fresner, Newton [10], and Lavoisier, outlined 
preferences according to which a wider explanatory 
breadth beat a narrower one. Moreover, Whewell, 
many figureheads of logical empiricism (e.g., Hempel), 
and analytical philosophers (e.g., Friedman and 
Kitcher) regarded the widening of explanatory breadth 
as an aim of science. 
However, over the last 40 years or so, it has also 
become well documented in philosophy of science 
journals that generalizability issues are not that 
straightforward, even in the fields where we most 
expect them (e.g., in physics). Even the fundamental 
laws of physics might not be truly generalizable; they 
apply only in highly idealized counterfactual 
conditions [11]. Moreover, it is widely reported in 
many sciences that an increase in explanatory breadth 
(e.g., generalizability) often decreases explanation 
accuracy or prediction accuracy. Similarly, increasing 
realism tends to decrease explanatory breadth 
(“generalizability” decreased). For example, in cancer 
research, efforts to obtain increasingly better 1) 
explanation accuracy and 2) prediction accuracy have 
resulted in cancer accounts becoming increasingly 
narrower (progressively less generalizable). Moreover, 
highly specific treatments, which, in IS terms, would 
have a “lack of generalizability,” have been introduced.  
IS thinking has not yet benefitted from these 
“generalizability” considerations that have featured in 
many sciences. Several hundred papers have been 
written about this topic in philosophy of science 
journals under technical jargon, which may appear 
foreign to IS readers. 
We explain some of these technical concepts to IS 
readers in anticipation that IS researchers will 
understand that narrowing scope is not tantamount to 
narrowing contributions. For example, if there is no 
need for explanation accuracy (or prediction accuracy) 
and a high level of realism, then the scope of the study 
or theory could be wide, and “lack of generalizability” 
can be seen as a demerit. However, if explanation or 
prediction accuracy is highly valued, then theories or 
studies may become increasingly narrower (and less 
generalizable) in indeterministic settings. In such 
cases, what has thus far been seen as “lack of 
generalizability” in IS could be seen not as a limitation, 
but as a merit of a study. 
 
2. Preference for statistical generalizability 
or unification  
 
Influential sources argue that qualitative studies are 
required to meet the standard of statistical, sample-
based conception of generalizability [1, 4]. What could 
these sample-based generalization issues be? For 
example, you have 20 interviews, and the reviewers 
ask that you do (say) 100 more in order to have 
statistical power to claim (statistical generalizability) 
[12]. Lee and Baskerville [4] maintained that such a 
requirement for qualitative studies is unjustified. We 
agree that the requirement of statistical generalizability 
– e.g., high sample size – for all qualitative studies 
misunderstand the purpose of qualitative research. 
Having said that, we suggest that the evidence 
provided by Lee and Baskerville [4] points to concerns 
other than statistical generalizability (and sample size). 
Lee and Baskerville [4 p. 223] presented 12 examples 
of “Published Research that Applies the Statistical, 
Sampling-Based Conception of Generalizability to 
Nonstatistical, Nonsampling Research: Examples from 
Case Research.” We do not doubt that this may 
happen. However, many (if not all) of Lee and 
Baskerville’s [4 p. 223] examples could be interpreted 
as presenting cases in which the authors discussed 
concerns other than applying “the Statistical, 
Sampling-Based Conception of Generalizability to 
Nonstatistical, Nonsampling Research” [4]. For 
example, Robey and Sahay, in the example cited by 
Lee and Baskerville [4 p. 223], noted that “each 
context is different so we should expect different 
contextual elements… The findings should not even be 
extended to other settings... What is true for GIS in the 
two local country governments studied may be untrue 
for GIS in other governmental units or in private 
enterprise.”   
Robey and Sahay noted that “each context is 




extended to other settings.” Robey and Sahay might 
not have referred to sample size adequateness; rather, 
“findings should not even be extended to other 
settings,” and they may not refer to statistical 
generalizability2. Instead, “each context is different” 
implies that some explanans3 are expected to be 
different per context. In the case of Robey and Sahay, 
organization-specific explanans clarify why findings 
“should not even be extended to other settings.” The 
more organization-specific explanans there are, the 
fewer findings are transferrable or generalizable to all 
organizations. Discussion of organization (or context) 
specific explanans as a “lack of generalizability” is not 
necessarily the same thing as statistical 
generalizability. In IS, both concerns are discussed 
under generalizability. We suggest that in many of the 
examples by [4], the authors refer to 
explanans/explanandum differences and not 
necessarily “the Statistical, Sampling-Based 
Conception of Generalizability.” The authors [4] and 
their critic [13] do not discuss this possibility.   
A simple example hopefully clarifies the difference 
between these two types of generalizability claims4. 
Let us assume that we found that explanans A (e.g., a 
set of dynamic mechanisms) explains cancer subtype 1 
(but not subtype 2), and explanans B explains cancer 
subtype 2 (but not subtype 1). In IS jargon, the findings 
from cancer subtype 1 are not generalizable to subtype 
2 (and vice versa). However, this “lack of 
generalizability” has nothing do with the “Statistical, 
Sampling-Based Conception of Generalizability” [4]. 
Different cancers have different explanans (e.g., cancer 
subtype 1 is explained by different explanans from 
cancer subtype 2). If this is the case, then no statistical 
technique or increase in sample size can change this 
outcome. This is because the explanans are different, 
and an increase in sample size cannot make the 
explanans the same. Lee and Baskerville [36] seemed 
to discuss such issues as “Published Research that 
Applies the Statistical, Sampling-Based Conception of 
Generalizability to Nonstatistical, Nonsampling 
Research.” In addition, numerous articles in MISQ 
                                                
2 E.g., statistical generalizability “consists of generalizing from 
research findings about the sample to those same characteristics in 
the corresponding population” [13 p. 19] 
3 Term explanandum (plural explananda) refers to a phenomenon 
that is explained [14]. Explanans (plural explanantia) explains the 
explanandum [14]. Originally, explanans were laws (and initial 
conditions) [14]. In contemporary philosophy of science, explanans 
can be other than laws, e.g., mechanism, factors, variables, causes, 
powers, events, process – virtually anything that accounts for the 
explanandum. 
4 This is not an analogy between the Robey and Sahay example. The 
point is to illustrate how explanans differences are different from the 
“Statistical, Sampling-Based Conception of Generalizability”. 
applied qualitative and quantitative methods and 
discussed such context-specific findings as limitations 
and lack of generalizability. For example, findings on 
“type of IT workers” are not generalizable to other IT 
workers [2], and “different ERPs” and “industry type” 
may not be transferable to other ERPs and industry 
types [3]. In these examples, the generalizability 
concern is not sample size adequateness in claiming 
statistical power and generalizability. Why are such 
findings regarded as limitations and a “lack of 
generalizability” in IS rather than as strengths? 
Assume that previous research had a cancer-type-
specific theory (say, a lymphoma-specific theory) that 
explained all types of lymphomas; then, later, it was 
found that lymphomas could be classified as non-
Hodgkin versus Hodgkin lymphomas [15, 16] that 
have different explanans and, therefore, subtype-
specific treatments. In cancer research, this is 
understood as positive progress, not a limitation or 
“lack of generalizability.” If it was found that patients 
with cancer subtype A are better off with specific 
treatment X, and cancer subtype B requires specific 
treatment Y, then describing such a finding as a lack of 
generalizability and a limitation would be odd, even 
though the results would be cancer-type-specific and 
could not be generalized to other cancers or even other 
lymphomas. 
However, regarding such findings as implying a 
lack of generalizability or a limitation is 
understandable if there is a priori belief that a broad 
theory or study scope is better than a narrow one, as 
proposed by unificationists from Whewell [17] to 
Kitcher [18] (see next section). If the aim of the 
science is unifying (e.g., “finding common explanans 
across cancers, IT use or social media use”) rather than 
dis-unifying (e.g., finding cancer-specific explanans or 
finding how the use of a certain type of computer game 
is different from a smartphone or a wide-screen 
computer), such views make sense. We have observed 
beliefs pertaining to scopes that are perceived as too 
narrow by top IS journal editors. For example, it was 
proposed by an SE that a study or theory that explained 
only Facebook (FB) use was not acceptable in a top IS 
journal because it did not explain other types of social 
media uses. Similarly, a study or theory of password 
selection was regarded as unacceptable because, for 
many reviewers/editors, “acceptable” studies or 
theories should explain a number of different IS 
security behaviors. These questions are often discussed 
as a lack of generalizability in IS. However, the 
concern is not about sample size or other statistical 
generalization issue, but rather whether FB use can be 
different from other types of social media use. FB use 
theory would have a narrower scope than a theory that 




theory/study on password selection would be narrower 
in scope than a theory/study that explains many kinds 
of IS security behaviors. These generalizability 
concerns implicitly assume unification preferences. We 
discuss these next. 
 
3. Unification and laws 
 
There are important differences between different 
sciences within the natural sciences and between the 
social and natural sciences. However, the IS 
discussions on (non-statistical) generalizability are not 
thus far related to such differences. The need for 
generalizability is justified or introduced as a general 
scientific preference. For example, IS views refer to 
“natural sciences” [5 p. 35] and “basic research” [4 p. 
221]. Similarly, there is the claim that “generalizability 
should be given a higher position in the scientific 
process and the ultimate goal” is based on sciences in 
general rather than specific characteristics of IS or 
social sciences [6]. Finally, Davison and Martinsons [8 
p. 242] noted that “research that is relevant for and 
applicable to a wider range of phenomena is 
traditionally considered to be more useful.” Again, 
they [8] do not claim that this particular observation is 
specific to any particular science.  
Since these IS views refer to natural science, basic 
research, and the goal of sciences in general, we shall 
now review what has been written on this topic in 
philosophy of science journals. The terms used are 
consilience of inductions, common cause, explanatory 
unification, explanation simplification, logical 
unification, derivational unification, value conflicts, 
etc. An overview of these concepts will shed new light 
on current IS practice and views on scope. 
 
3.1. Laws and scope  
 
It was once taken for granted that the scientific 
theories are (mainly) true laws. With the standard law 
concept, the issue of scope was straightforward: 
“Traditionally, the word ‘laws’ has been reserved for 
universally applicable, exceptionless generalizations” 
[19 p. 731]. For example, Popper [20] regarded 
theories as laws that were 100% exception-less [21; 
19]5. The paradigmatic case for laws was Newton’s 
law of gravitation [22 p. 409]. Newton’s theory 
“originally claimed to apply to all bodies through the 
universe at all times” [22 p. 409]. 
Many philosophers, who assumed that scientific 
theories are laws, outlined theory scope preferences, 
known as unification. But what is unification? This is 
                                                
5 “Scientific law” means “Of all points in space and time (or in all 
regions of space and time) it is true that” [20 p. 68]. 
what we discuss next. This discussion is important 
because many IS views on generalizability may 
implicitly or explicitly reflect this view. 
Whewell [17] outlined a classical account 
“consilience of inductions.” He claimed that “a test of 
the truth of the theory” is when a hypothesis explains 
more than “one class of facts” or when it predicts the 
“cases of a kind different from those which were 
contemplated in the formation of our hypothesis” [17]. 
For example, Whewell’s [17] first requirement can be 
seen as unification and simplification [23]. Let us 
presume that different hypotheses explain Facebook 
(FB) use and Twitter use, and then, a new hypothesis 
(H3) explains both FB and Twitter use. Explanation 
simplification happens only if one hypothesis can 
explain both (instead of two). H3 has a wider scope 
than H1 and H2 in terms of the number of phenomena 
explained. Whewell’s view can be interpreted in terms 
of simplification, common cause, or a hypothesis’ 
scope or “explanatory breadth.”6  
Whewell’s [17] doctrine was influential. A number 
of major thinkers, including Jevons, Fowler, Pierce, 
and Popper, agreed with Whewell that the best theory 
or hypothesis “is the one which has predicted new 
phenomena, explained phenomena of different kinds” 
[23 p. 177]. For example, Thagard [24 p. 30] reported 
“explanatory breadth” as a key criterion for evaluating 
theories, which means that “one theory has more 
explanatory breadth than its competitor if it explains 
more classes of facts.” Numerous philosophers have 
outlined various unification theories, including 
Friedman’s [25] explanatory unification, Mäki’s [26] 
logical unification, Mäki’s [27] derivational 
unification, and Kitcher’s [18] explanatory unification. 
We can summarize these accounts with the following 
simplifying statement. An increase in explananda 
(number of phenomena explained or predicted) 
increases the scope (or breadth) of a model or theory. 
In this case, (non-statistical) generalizability increases. 
Let us assume that it is believed that a set of explanans 
A explains Twitter use and a set of explanans B 
explains FB use. Now, presume a new study that 
suggests that a set of explanans C explains both 
Twitter and FB use. With this new study, explanandum 
unification has occurred. Previously (in our example), 
Twitter and FB use was explained by a different set of 
explanans. This new study suggests the same 
                                                
6 If H1 explains FB use and H2 explains Twitter use, then the new 
H3 seems to constitute both simpler explanations for the class “social 
media” but not for those of FB and Twitter. This is because both still 
have equally many numbers of explanatory reasons (hypotheses). 
However, in this simple example, H3 could be a common cause for 
FB and Twitter, while H1 and H2 could be separate causes. In this 
case, the “explanatory breadth” of H3 would be wider than those of 




explanans for Twitter and FB use. It can be regarded as 
introducing explanandum unification because it has 
unified two phenomena (Twitter and FB use), which 
were previously regarded as two different phenomena 
(because they had different sets of explanans: A and 
B). At the same time, the range of explanandum has 
increased with the new study. The new study can 
explain FB and Twitter use; while the previous 
accounts could only explain one. 
In turn, a decrease in explananda narrows the 
scope, and (non-statistical) generalizability decreases. 
In the case of studies that explain, a decrease in 
explananda decreases explanatory breadth. Let us 
presume that according to paper 1, FB and Twitter 
have the same set of explanans. If one later shows in 
study 2 that they have different explanans, then dis-
unification has happened. In addition, non-statistical 
generalizability has decreased from paper 1 to paper 2. 
That is to say that the scope of paper 2 is narrower than 
that of paper 1.  
Classical unificationists from Whewell to Kitcher 
would not have appreciated what we have called a 
decrease in explananda. However, there are often other 
important concerns at stake, which were not taken into 
account in these classical unificationists’ doctrines. 
Next, we explain what these concerns are. This 
discussion helps us understand that narrowing the 
scope (a decrease in explananda and a decrease in non-
statistical generalizability) can be very important in 
many cases. 
 
4. Value conflicts: accuracy versus scope 
 
For Laudan [28], theories are solutions to important 
problems. Laudan [28 p. 35] introduced the terms 
comparative generality and weighting by generality: “if 
we can show for any two [scientific] problems p’ and 
p, that any solution [i.e., theories] to p’ must also 
constitute a solution for p (but not visa versa) then p’ is 
more general, and thus of greater weight, than p.” 
Laudan [28 p. 35] called this “comparative generality.” 
His example is that finding the law for the motion of 
Mars has less “general comparatively” than finding the 
for the motion of all planets. However, he [28 p. 35] 
recognized that “there are many other cases which do 
not permit one to evaluate their comparative 
generality.” What does Laudan mean by this? While he 
did not explain this, his former colleague provided an 
explanation that shocked many philosophers. We now 
turn to Kuhn. 
Kuhn [29 p. 52] claimed that (what he called as) 
normal science, values “the steady extension of the 
scope.” However, he maintained that on a rational 
basis, scientists even within one discipline could not 
agree on the precise meaning of this concept. Scientists 
might agree that a wide theory scope is better than a 
narrow one, but there was disagreement regarding what 
this meant precisely [29, 30]. Let us illustrate this idea 
with IS examples. Lee and Baskerville [4] discussed 
generalizability in terms of “different contexts.” [31] 
discussed the importance of generalizability, which 
was termed “applicability to different environments” 
and “a variety of contexts.” A Kuhnian might claim 
that scholars often agree with some concepts, say, that 
the study should be applicable to a “variety of 
contexts,” but they cannot agree on a rational basis 
regarding when precisely a study meets these goals. 
For example, does a case study of two organizations 
meet a “variety of contexts” or “different contexts”?  
Moreover, due to value conflicts, the issue becomes 
even more challenging, according to Kuhn [30 p. 262]:  
“In many concrete situations, different values, 
though all constitutive of good reason, dictate different 
conclusions, different choices. In such cases of value-
conflict (e.g., one theory is simpler but one is more 
accurate) the relative weight placed on different values 
by different individuals can play a decisive role in 
choice. More important, though scientists share these 
values…, they do not all apply them in the same way. 
Simplicity, scope, fruitfulness, and even accuracy can 
be judged quite differently…by different people”.  
Here, Kuhn introduced a term that has been very 
important in science, although we have not yet 
discussed it: accuracy (or precision). Before we discuss 
this concept, it is important to note that in biology, 
biochemistry, or cancer research, explanations are not 
primarily law-based, but mechanism-based [21, 32]. 
Mechanism-based accounts in biology and 
biochemistry are commonly regarded as “highly 
particularized” [21 p. 763]. Also, laws are questionable 
in social science [33].  
Moreover, since the 1970s, philosophers have 
reported that even the fundamental laws of physics are 
not really true (exception-less) laws: “fundamental 
laws are not true, nor nearly true, nor true for the most 
part [11 p. 175]. For example, “Newton’s first 
law…refers to what happens to a body that is subject to 
no external forces, but there are probably no such 
bodies” [34 p. 358]. As a final example, Nagel [35 p. 
131] reported that “It is common if not normal for a 
theory to be formulated in terms of ideal concepts such 
as…perfect vacuum, infinitely slow expansion, perfect 
elasticity…” Ideal concepts are “simplifying false-
hoods” [36 p. 242]. For example, assuming a perfect 
vacuum, which some theories of physics do, is a 
deliberate false representation of the phenomenon [37, 
38]. As a result, even fundamental laws of physics 
either 1) make true claims, which apply only in highly 
idealized counterfactual settings, or 2) make false 




example, “how few are the known exact, true, and 
general laws that apply to actual as opposed to ideal 
conditions. They may be none at all” [19 p. 730]. Thus, 
“even our best theories [in physics] are severely 
limited in their scope.” [39 p. 13]. 
 
4.1 Science examples of accuracy versus scope 
 
Explanation and prediction (accuracy) can be two 
different things. Explanation and prediction do not 
necessarily go hand in hand, a point not taken into 
account by, for example, the Hempel and Oppenheim 
[14] model. For instance, a prediction can be accurate, 
but an explanation might be less accurate or unknown. 
A case in point is that even though the detailed 
molecular mechanism of rituximab (a cancer drug) is 
not well understood, rituximab is a scientifically 
accepted treatment. The reason for this is related to the 
drug’s effectiveness. We might call that prediction 
accuracy. What does this mean? Take, for instance, an 
example of cancer treatment for one type of cancer: 
diffuse large B-cell lymphoma (DLBCL). One 
treatment combines rituximab and chemotherapy. For 
example, in DLBCL, at the 2-year follow-up point, 
70% of patients treated with rituximab and 
chemotherapy were alive, compared to 57% who 
received only chemotherapy [40]. The prediction 
accuracy of chemotherapy in DLBCL can be said to be 
57%, while that of rituximab combined with 
chemotherapy is 70%. However, prediction accuracy 
can be seen as a statistical average. In practice, this 
means that the effect of chemotherapy (treatments) 
varies from patient to patient. One might die before the 
two-year follow-up; another might be alive up to that 
point or even longer; for a third patient, the 
chemotherapy can have lethal side effects. Prediction 
accuracy rate studies may also vary from one study to 
another, for example, because cancers hardly follow 
laws [41], and cancer formation (carcinogenesis) is 
highly dynamic and random [42]. 
Kuhn’s reply to value conflicts shocked many 
philosophers [43]. Let us presume that two scholars 
agree that a “wide theory scope is important and 
(prediction) accuracy is important.” Let us presume 
that they do agree what both mean precisely, which 
Kuhn [29] denied. Let us say that the wide theory 
scope means a “theory that explains two types of 
cancers is better than a theory that explains one type of 
cancer.” Let us also presume that scholars agree on 
what accuracy means: it is the overall survival rate or 
the percentage of patients who are still alive after the 
(say) 2-year follow-up point (“prediction accuracy”). 
Let us presume that we have theory 1 (T1), which 
explains and has a treatment for two types of cancers A 
and B. Then we have two other separate theories (T2, 
T3) for cancers A and B. T2 can account only for 
cancer A (and nothing more), while T3 explains only 
cancer B (and nothing else). T1 is more generalizable; 
it explains cancers A and B, but its prediction accuracy 
is low. Say T1 has 20% accuracy for cancer A and 
15% accuracy for cancer B. In turn, T2 and T3 are less 
generalizable. Each applies to only one type of cancer. 
But T2 has 90% accuracy for cancer A, and T3 has 
90% accuracy for cancer B (90% of patients treated 
with T2- and T3-based treatments were alive at the 
standard two-year follow-up point).  
Kuhn [30] claimed that in such circumstances, two 
scholars may diverge on which theory is better—even 
though they agree that a “wide theory scope is 
important and accuracy is important.” Even if they 
agree on what these two values mean precisely, which 
Kuhn once denied [29], they may still come to a 
different conclusion about which theory is preferred, 
according to Kuhn. For example, the first scholar 
prefers T1, while the other scholar prefers T2 and T3. 
For Kuhn, these are not a few exceptional cases. They 
“are what goes on in the sciences at times of theory 
choice” [44 p. 325]. Kuhn is highly skeptical that 
scholars can agree in such situations; the decision is 
personal and subjective. According to him, they cannot 
be solved by “evidence and reason” [43 p. 14]. We 
return to our cancer research example. 
While T1 is more generalizable than T2 and T3, T2 
and T3 have much better prediction accuracy than T1. 
Our readers may disagree with Kuhn—value conflicts 
could be solved. Most likely, oncologists would agree 
that T2 and T3 are better than T1, although they are 
less generalizable than T1. What happened here? R.M. 
Hare [45] would have called this an overriding of 
values. While breadth is an important value, in our 
example, prediction accuracy is even more important. 
In our example, we cannot have both, and prediction 
accuracy overrides generalizability (explanatory 
breadth). Cancer researchers and oncologists would not 
necessarily trade off a specific theory to have a general 
theory of cancer if the general theory is less accurate. 
However, we argue that resolving such value conflicts 
may be situational and dependent on the aim of the 
research. In mathematical models of cancer research, 
generalizability could be more important than an 
accurate (and realistic) explanation or prediction, 
especially when there is no direct expectation to apply 
the research in practice. 
Similar examples of the resolution of value 
conflicts can be given in many sciences, but Kuhn [29, 
30, 44] was not aware of this. In population biology, 
MacArthur and Levins [46] traded off precision in 
order to have better realism and wider generality. 
Others [47, 48] traded off realism to have wider 




knowingly unrealistic assumptions in their models. 
This was also the approach in Nobel laureate 
Friedman’s [49] methodology of economics. He [49] 
felt that he could not have a wide scope, realism, and 
accurate predictions at the same time. For him [49], a 
wide scope and prediction accuracy were much more 
important than realism, which he traded off. Thus, for 
him, good theories in economics can have assumptions 
that “never are” realistic. He purposefully traded off 
realism for a wide scope and prediction accuracy. His 
exemplar was physics, in general, and Galileo’s law of 
fall in particular [38]. Friedman [49] knew that the law 
has numerous purposefully false assumptions. 
Had he looked up cancer research as an exemplar 
instead of Galileo’s law, he might not have traded off 
realism so easily because it would have resulted in 
cancer treatments that do not work in practice. Recall 
that mechanism-based explanations are commonly 
regarded as highly particularized in biology [21]. As an 
example of a cancer mechanism in biology and 
biochemistry, the humoral theory once explained all 
medical concerns from cancer to melancholy [50]. 
Thereafter came cancer-specific accounts, which 
explained not all medical diseases, but all cancers. 
Later, upon realizing that different cancers had 
different complex dynamic mechanisms, cancer 
research followed up, and narrower cancer-type-
specific explanations were sought [50]. However, 
cancer research did not stop there. There are now 
hundreds of distinct cancer accounts for different types 
of cancers [50]. There are cancer-specific explanations, 
which may not be generalizable to any other cancers or 
phenomena in science, according to current 
knowledge. Similarly, there are cancer-specific drugs 
that are applicable only to certain types of cancers, and 
their effect may not be equally generalizable to other 
types of cancers [50]. Such particularistic theorizing in 
cancer research has, on its own, saved the lives of 
numerous people. If scientific studies or theories must 
be applicable to various different settings (e.g., explain 
many types of cancers) or always toward increasingly 
greater scope in order to prove that the study is good 
science, then cancer-type-specific theorizing 
exemplifies not-so-good science. The progress of 
cancer research in biology and biochemistry can be 
(partly) explained by prioritizing explanation accuracy 
over generalizability. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
A decrease in or narrowness of theory scope 
does not necessarily reduce practical and scientific 
relevance. Many influential IS scholars, regardless of 
background, are certain that a wider scope is better 
than a narrow scope, both scientifically and practically. 
Alternatively, they suggest that a narrow scope is less 
useful, less strong, more uninteresting, and more 
unimportant than a wider scope [8 p. 24] [9 p. 9] [7 p. 
15]. Such views make sense in the logical empiricist 
and Popperian utopia where there are true, universal 
(exception-less) laws. The extent to which such laws 
exist in physics is questionable, let alone in medical 
research, biochemistry, or social sciences.  
Outside of such a utopian world, narrowing the 
theory or study scope does not necessarily decrease 
practical importance or impact. This becomes clear 
when we discuss how potential scientific impacts can 
be different from theory scope generality and 
specificity as well as how common a problem the issue 
(explanandum) is. For example, pancreatic cancer is 
rarer than breast cancer. However, currently, pancreatic 
cancer is a more serious problem, on average, than 
breast cancer because the former is lethal in nearly all 
cases (breast cancer is more often curable, if found 
early enough). We may say that the impact of 
pancreatic cancer is higher than that of breast cancer, if 
the yardstick is lethality. In addition, the scope of 
generality and specificity does not necessarily go hand 
in hand with the scientific impact. Arguably, there is 
something unique in the explanans of pancreatic cancer 
that is not fully understood because it cannot be cured. 
Who wants to claim that we should not examine lethal 
pancreatic cancer even though its scope is narrow, even 
though it has unique explanans and yet is rare? It is 
also possible that the theory with a highly narrow 
scope can have greater potential for practical impact 
than a study with a more general scope. Many 
scientists have recognized that narrowing the 
theoretical scope may increase practical relevance. In 
IS jargon, narrowing (explanatory) the scope is not 
tantamount to weakening contributions. What, 
therefore, indicates a narrowing scope? We discuss two 
important reasons next. 
Increased explanatory accuracy is one reason 
why a scope is narrowed. We link explanatory 
accuracy with explanans. For example, non-Hodgkin 
and Hodgkin are two types of lymphomas, but why do 
they require separate theorizing? The answer is 
because these two lymphomas have different 
explanans. If two explananda can be adequately 
understood using the same explanans, then they are 
most likely about the same phenomenon. If two 
explananda have different explanans, then this is an 
indication that these are two separate phenomena, 
which may require distinct theorizing. We can have a 
theory that explains both non-Hodgkin and Hodgkin 
lymphomas, but this theory would be less accurate than 
specific theories for each. Moreover, we also need 
studies with a narrower scope, even when such 




simplicity, let us presume that all lymphomas are either 
accounted by Theory (T) 1 or T2. This we could only 
know by scrutinizing all candidates for lymphomas. 
This idea (differences in explanans) also applies in IS. 
If people have different reasons (explanans) for using 
(say) Facebook rather than (say) Twitter, then this is a 
good indication that separate theorizing may be 
required for each. In such a case, we can have a more 
abstract and general theory that explains both 
Facebook and Twitter use, but this theory may be less 
accurate than specific theories for each. Moreover, the 
problem with the general theory may be more than an 
accuracy issue. For example, models of computer 
abuse explain all types of information security policy 
non-compliance issues, from not locking a computer to 
reusing the same password across different accounts. 
However, let us presume that reusing a password is 
explained by problems with memorizing, while other 
types of information security policy non-compliance 
issues are not. If this were the case, then models of 
computer abuse would not only be inaccurate, but 
mainly inappropriate to explain password reuse 
behavior. 
Increased prediction accuracy is another reason 
why a scope is narrowed. In medical research, 
prediction accuracy is linked with the effect of the 
treatment. Lymphoma-type specific or unique 
treatments have a narrower scope than a “general 
treatment” for all lymphomas. Why are such specific 
treatments developed and used? The answer is 
straightforward. It is hoped that they will be more 
effective than the general treatment. In fact, a general 
treatment for lymphomas can even be life threatening 
for treating specific lymphomas. 
What does this means for IS? We could say that 
“the more effective the treatment, the better,” and this a 
posteriori matter then ultimately sets the scope. 
However, the issue is far from being that simple. For at 
least two complex reasons, there is hardly a single 
concrete solution that is universal in every IS research 
area. First, what counts as “effectiveness” (prediction 
accuracy) varies even within medicine. Effectiveness 
means different things in cancer treatments compared 
with (say) anesthesiology treatments. Similar 
differences are assumed in different areas of IS. For 
example, a key area in IS security is improving users’ 
behavior through interventions such as fear appeals. 
But what counts as effectiveness is not straightforward. 
For instance, are we measuring the effect right after the 
intervention, two weeks later, or two months later? Do 
we count the possible side effects of fear appeals (e.g., 
users stop reading security-related email)? Moreover, 
not all studies can do all of these things, and such 
decisions implicitly limit the scope. Finally, the same 
measures of effectiveness may not work with (say) IT 
use. These issues must be discussed carefully in future 
IS research.  
Second, prediction accuracy is also a complex 
methodological issue. For example, prediction and 
explanation accuracy of the same phenomenon are 
typically importantly different in actual settings versus 
1) counterfactual laboratory settings, 2) mathematical 
models, or 3) statistical models with statistical 
averages. A case in point are fundamental laws of 
physics. They commonly contain purposeful false 
assumptions (e.g., perfect vacuum, magnetic, and other 
forces are absent; air pressure is nil) [11, 38]. Their 
predictions may hold in counterfactual settings (e.g., in 
laboratory, mathematical models), where these 
assumptions could be met. However, in real settings 
(generally speaking), their predictions can be, strictly 
speaking, false [11, 51]7. In other words, the scope of a 
law in physics can be made purposefully wide in a 
counterfactual model (e.g., making all forces absent), 
with full awareness that the model falsely describes the 
actual phenomenon. Thus, the scope of a theory in a 
model or theoretical settings can be wide. In real 
settings, the scope of the same theory can be either 
highly limited or even inapplicable (without serious 
modifications). Such issues also exist in IS, albeit they 
might not have been recognized. These issues have 
scope implications and must be discussed and debated 




Influential IS scholars outline an a priori belief: wider 
scope beats narrower scope, or studies with narrower 
scope are less strong, less useful, less interesting and 
less important than studies with wider scope. If we 
evaluate cancer research in light of these IS views, then 
both cancer biology and medical oncology have 
become (generally speaking) increasingly less useful, 
less strong, more uninteresting, and more unimportant 
over the last 200 years. Such beliefs related to IS scope 
should be rejected in their original form. However, 
they are understandable, if one’s understanding of the 
philosophy of science is based on the arguments of 
logical empiricists (e.g., Hempel) or Popper up to the 
1970s. In such a worldview, scientific theories were 
true exceptionless laws, and singular events or 
observations were explained by these laws. Today, it is 
known that even the fundamental laws of physics do 
not constitute such laws [11]. In cancer research, for 
example, a phenomenon can be rare and have a narrow 
                                                
7 “The models that our theories [of physics] are able to handle are 
deliberate falsifications of reality…the theory may then accurately 
describe the workings of the model, but the model does not describe 




scope, yet a study of it can be scientifically and 
practically relevant and valuable. Narrowing the scope 
does not necessarily decrease the contribution 
(scientific or practical impact); it may increase it. 
However, we are not saying that a narrower scope is a 
priori preferred over a wider one. Our view is that in 
empirical sciences (outside of logic/mathematics), 
theory/study scope is not an a priori issue, but largely 
an a posteriori issue. Having said that, a theory or 
study scope may also be narrowed or widened in 
sciences for methodological or instrumental reasons. 
For example, increasing the scope (generalizability) in 
sciences (from physics to economy) is often done at the 
expense of realism and accuracy by 1) omitting 
relevant explanans (method of isolation), 2) having a 
less accurate description of the explanans (method of 
abstraction), or 3) introducing purposeful falsehoods in 
the explanans or explanandum (idealizations). These 
have scope implications, and future IS philosophy is 
needed to understand all of these methods, including 
prediction accuracy, and how they are implicitly or 
explicitly used in IS. 
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